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BOUSE v. HUTZLER

ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AS A GUIDE TO
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES
Bouse v. Hutzler1

In her will, testatrix had made sundry bequests to collateral legatees. She provided as to these legacies that any
collateral inheritance tax, or other tax, that should be payable on the bequests should be paid out of the residue of
her estate, and not be deducted from such legacies. The
executor, in calculating payments due the State under its
Collateral Inheritance Tax Law, subtracted the amount of
the tax on the specific legacy from the residuary estate
and then calculated the amount of tax due on the residuary
estate remaining after this deduction. The Register of
Wills for Baltimore City contended that this method of
calculation permitted the testatrix, by her provision that
the tax on her gift be paid from the residuary estate, to
diminish the amount of tax collectible by the State. His
contention was that the entire estate of the testatrix was
subject to tax, and that when a testator provides that the
tax on specific legacies be paid out of the residue of his
estate, the residue must bear this tax and must also pay a
tax on the amount of the whole residue before such deduction is made. The lower court supported the executor.
The Court of Appeals reversed and ruled in accordance
with the contention of the Register of Wills.
Eliminating from this discussion the problems of arithmeticians in calculating the particular tax on this estate,
the sole question in controversy is the construction of the
applicable provisions of the Maryland inheritance tax statute.2 The lower court, in its ruling supporting the method
of calculation and the statutory construction for which
the executor contended and holding that no additional tax
was due the State, relied heavily on the assertion that such
126 A. (2d) 767 (Md., 1942).
1Md. Code (1939) Art. 81, Secs. 109-112; Sec. 110 having special reference
to the instant case reads, in part: "There is hereby levied and imposed a
tax at the rate of seven and one-half per centum on every one hundred
dollars of the clear value of any and all property, having a taxable 8itus in
this State, passing at the death of any resident or non-resident decedent,
in trust or otherwise, to or for the use of any person or persons, other
than the father, mother, husband, wife, children or lineal descendants of
such decedent . . ." (Italics added.)

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

calculation was in accordance with "unvarying administrative practice". 3 In reversing the lower court the Court of
Appeals held that the fact that the residuary estate was
designated to pay the collateral inheritance tax did not
affect the amount of tax due the State; and, further, that
when the taxing statute provided for the payment of a tax
"on every $100 of clear value of property bequeathed", the
payment of a tax for the legatee was receipt by him of
inherited property which was taxable within the meaning
of the statute. It was therefore concluded by the Court
that the proper method of computing the tax was to treat
the payment of the tax for the legatee as a second gift to
him, which was subject to tax as any other property passing by inheritance must be subject, under provisions of the
Maryland statute. In doing this, it stated that there "was
no administrative practice", and so made its own interpretation of the Act.
The Court of Appeals was passing directly on the law
involved for the first time in its 98 years on the statute
books.4 During the period of administration of this law,
while there was no direct judicial interpretation, there
were five Attorney Generals' opinions 5 as to the statute's
meaning, with administration of the statute in accordance
with these rulings. It was against this background of
statutory provisions not judicially construed (but necessarily administered) for almost a hundred years that the
Maryland court reiterated rules of administrative construction, some of which it had promulgated as early as 1829.6
Dealing 'first with a statute clear and unambiguous on
its face, the Court said, "Where the language is clear and
explicit and susceptible of sensible construction, it cannot
be controlled by extraneous considerations. No custom,
however long and generally it has been followed by officials, can nullify the plain meaning and purpose of a statute. An administrative practice contrary to the plain
language of a statute is a violation of the law, and a violation of the law, even though customary, does not repeal
the law." And in reference to ambiguous statutes which
have been administered under settled administrative con8 Opinion of Dennis, C. J., in Superior Court of Baltimore City, filed May
9, 1942, Baltimore Daily Record, May 23, 1942.
1 Md. Laws 1844, Ch. 237 was the first appearance of the present provisions. See supra, n. 2.
6 Op. Atty. Gen. 495 (Md., 1921) ; 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 244 (Md., 1924) ; 12
Op. Atty. Gen. 282 (Md., 1927); 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 488 (Md., 1934); Op.
Atty. Gen. (Md., 1941), Baltimore Daily Record, Nov. 11, 1941.
6 Hays v. Richardson, 1 G. & J. 366 (Md., 1829).
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struction, the Court said, "It is quite true that where language of a statute is ambiguous and susceptible of two
reasonable constructions, a long and unvarying administrative practice has a very persuasive influence, if not an
entirely controlling effect, upon the judicial construction
of the statute. But the rule of contemporaneous construction does not preclude an inquiry into the correctness of
such a construction."
As to the Court's statement on interpretation of ambiguous statutes, all courts agree that there is no occcasion for
reference to administrative interpretation.7 As to the
value of administrative, as a guide to judicial, interpretation where an ambiguous statute is in question, it is not so8
simple to draw an accurate picture. The Virginia Court
states that administrative construction is allowed the same
effect as a course of judicial decisions; while the Colorado
Court 9 states that, though executive construction is entitled to great weight, it has never been of controlling force.
The Court of Appeals has used stronger language than
that in the instant case when construing what it has held
to be ambiguous statutes, saying in several cases, "Courts
should refrain from putting on a statute an interpretation
differing from that implied by administrative officials, except for the most potent and urgent reasons."'°
Vom Baur, in his work on Federal Administrative
Law," published in 1942, lays down three rules as to the
weight Federal courts have given administrative construction in situations where an agency has administered a
statute over a period of time during which no judicial interpretation has been obtained. These three rules are so
much a statement of the law of Maryland that it seems of
interest to state them, particularly in regard to Rule III,
frequently pronounced by the Maryland Court, but to
which no reference was made in the instant case.
The first rule the author states is that where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous an administrative
construction thereof is not material and has no persuasive
7 See note, Statute8-Construction-Effect Given to Practical Construction, (1935) 20 Minn. L. R. 59, n. 12, for full list of citations.
8 Smith v. Bryan, 100 Va. 199, 40 S. E. 652 (1902) ; Ballard v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 980, 159 S. E. 222 (1931).
People v. Higgins, 67 Colo. 441, 184 Pac. 365 (1919).
0Arnreich v. State, 150 Md. 91, 101, 132 A. 430, 434 (1926) ; AmericanStewart Distillery, Inc., v. Stewart Distilling Company, 168 Md. 212, 217,
177 A. 473, 475 (1935). (Italics supplied.)
1 VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADmINIsTRATIvE LAW (1942)

Secs. 478, et seq.
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force. This rule is stated
in the instant case, as well as in
12
earlier Maryland cases.
The second rule laid down by Vom Baur is that settled
administrative construction of an ambiguous statute is of
persuasive force. This is close to the language of the Maryland Court in the instant case, where the Court says, "A
long and unvarying administrative practice has a very
persuasive influence." This rule has found application in
many Maryland cases, though the language of the Court is
couched in considerable
stronger terms in some of the
13
earlier cases.

The third rule refers to situations where a statute has
received settled and uniform construction by the officers
charged with its administration and where during such
time the statute has been re-enacted without material
change. In such a situation Vom Baur states the re-enactment without material change will be presumed to be a
ratification by the legislative body of the administrative
construction. This rule, although conceivably applicable, 4
was not applied in the instant case. It is, nevertheless, a
statement of the Maryland law. In the case of Arnreich v.
State, involving construction of a licensing statute, under
which it was sought to collect a license tax from a class
hitherto not required to pay such license, the Court pointed
12 Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471 (1854) ; Frazier v. Warfield, 13
Md. 279 (1859) ; Smith v. State, 134 Md. 473, 107 A. 255 (1919).
" Hays v. Richardson, 1 G. & J. 366 (Md., 1829) ; The State v. Mayhew, 2
Gill 487 (Md., 1845) ; Frazier v. Warfield, 13 Md. 279 (1859) ; Baltimore
City v. Johnson, 96 Md. 737, 54 A. 646 (1903) ; Musgrove v. Balto. & Ohio
R. Co., 111 Md. 629, 75 A. 245 (1Q09) ; Mayor & City Council of Balt. v.
Machen, 132 Md. 618, 104 A. 175 (1918); Hess v. Westminster Savings
Bank, 134 Md. 125, 106 A. 263 (1919) ; Smith v. State, 134 Md. 473, 107 A.
255 (1919) ; Adding Machine Co. v. State, 146 Md. 192, 126 A. 127 (1924) ;
Arnreich v. State, 150 Md. 91, 132 A. 430 (1926); Congoleum Nairn v.
Brown, 158 Md. 285, 148 A- 220 (1929) ; American Stewart Distillery, Inc.,
v. Stewart Distilling Co., 168 id. 212, 177 A. 473 (1935) ; Election Supervisors v. Welch, 179 Md. 270, 275, 18 A. (2d) 202 (1941).
" A reference to the Record in this case and the Briefs of appellant and
appellee will reveal that there had been five Attorney Generals' opinions
as to this Statute's meaning. The first of these opinions, filed in 1921 (see
n. 5) favored the construction for which appellee contended, but this
was reversed in 1924 and four later opinions (see n. 5) followed, each
supporting the construction for which appellant contended and the construction which the Court reached in the instant case. For the period,
1924-1941, then, it should be noted there was continuous, uniform executive
construction and administration of the tax under these rulings. This
administration was coupled with a re-enactment of these statutory provisions at six sessions of the Legislature (see n. 17). This circumstance
was fully set out in the Brief filed by the appellant. However, as indicated in the text of this note, supra, third sentence after n. 3, the Court
stated that there was no consistent administrative practice; also, infra
circa. n. 18.
16 150 Md. 1. 132 A. 430 (192(i).
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to the 50 years that the statute had stood on the statute
books and the unvarying administrative construction during that period, coupled with re-enactment of the Act by
the Legislature without material change. The Court said
that re-enactment without inclusion of this particular class,
in the face of a known administrative practice of collecting
no license tax, was "practical ratification of the administrative construction placed upon the statute."'"
Since the statute in question in the instant case had
been on the statute books for 98 years and had been reenacted six times between 1924 and 1941 without material
change,' 7 except for changes in rates of the tax, the statement of the Court that, in its opinion, there "was no administrative practice""' would seem to be the only explanation for the Court's failure to apply this third well-recognized means of determining the legislative intent, which
is the sole goal in all statutory construction.
Aside from this omission of consideration of the rule
just discussed, the statements of the Court in the instant
case are in harmony with trends throughout the country
and are especially in accord with Federal practice. The
cases which the Court cites in its opinion, together with
many others on the subject of contemporaneous construction, illustrate principles of administrative law which
have been evolved in Maryland over more than 100 years.
They demonstrate that this subject is new only in the
terminology of the law.' 9 This modern segregation by
name is wise, if not necessary, because of rapidly expanding spheres of administrative action which cause more
frequent litigation and greater popular and professional
interest.
16 Ibid. See also: Baltimore City v. Johnson, 96 Md. 737, 54 A. 646
(1903); Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Machen, 132 Md. 618, 104 A. 175
(1918); Adding Machine Co. v. State, 146 Md. 192, 126 A. 127 (1924) ; Drug
& Chemical Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250, 166 A. 742 (1933).
7 Md. Laws 1924, Ch. 413; Md. Laws 1927, Ch. 242; Md. Laws 1929, Ch.
226, sec. 105; Md. Laws 1933, Ch. 323; Md. Laws 1935, Ch. 90, sec. 105;
Md. Laws 1936, s.s., Ch. 124, see. 105.
"See supra, n. 14.
"See GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (1941) 3.

